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2001, and the London bombings of July 2005, the ‘war on 
terror’ has led to the subjection of populations to new regimes of control and 
reinforced state sovereignty.  This involves, in countries such as the UK and the US, 
the limiting of personal freedoms, increased regulation of immigration and constant 
surveillance, as a response to the perceived increased risk of terrorist attacks.  In this 
paper I consider new surveillance technologies in secondary schools as a moment in 
the “war on terror” where recognisability is key to understanding the ways in which 
populations are racialised. I argue that the counter-terrorism agenda is one of the 
reasons why schools have invested to such an extent in new technologies of 
surveillance and explore the implications such surveillance has for the way in which 
students are raced. The paper applies a framework which combines a Critical Race 
Theory (CRT) analysis of white supremacy with Judith Butler’s (2004a, 2010) 
thinking on recognisable lives and Agamben’s (2005) state of exception in order to 
analyse how minority ethnic young people are constructed as ‘threatening’.  
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2001, and the London bombings of July 2005, the ‘war on 
terror’ has led to the subjection of populations to new regimes of control and 
reinforced state sovereignty.  This involves, in countries such as the UK and the US, 
the limiting of personal freedoms, increased regulation of immigration and constant 
surveillance, as a response to the perceived increased risk of terrorist attacks.  In this 
paper I argue that the counter-terrorism agenda is one of the reasons why schools have 
invested to such an extent in new technologies of surveillance, and explore the 
implications such surveillance has for the way in which students are raced.  
 
Recent years have seen an explosive expansion of new technologies of surveillance 
installed not just in the wider community, but also in UK secondary schools. 
Although there has been much discussion devoted to these new technologies and their 
impact in general, as an educational phenomenon, surveillance in schools is only just 
beginning to receive media and academic attention (for example, Hope, 2009; 
McCahill & Finn, 2010; Taylor, 2010).  Schools have installed Closed Circuit 
television cameras (CCTV), screening technologies including metal detectors and 
alcohol and drug testing, chipped identity cards and electronic registers, biometric 
tools such as iris and finger print recognition, cyberspace surveillance including 
webcams, internet logs, websites hosting student data for parental access, and auditing 
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programmes including student databases and threat assessment software, among 
others (Hope, 2009). There have been reports of systems to log the food on a pupil’s 
lunch tray and send this information to a website that parents can access to check their 
child’s diet (UK Press Association, 2009) and of CCTV cameras being installed in 
school toilets (Chadderton, 2009). 
 
The installation of surveillance devices tends to be justified on grounds of security 
(see for example Marx & Steeves, 2010). Protection from both external and internal 
threat of “dangerous others” provide the ostensible impetus for the installation of 
CCTV in schools in the UK, for example, after the stabbing of head teacher Phillip 
Lawrence at his school gate in 1995 and the massacre in a Dunblane Primary School 
in 1996 in which an outsider shot and killed 16 children and their teacher, fears 
around allegedly increasing knife crime, and also school and college shootings in the 
US such as Columbine (2001) or Virginia Tech (2007).  Reasons of health and 
personal safety are also cited for the introduction of these new technologies, including 
the reduction of bullying, theft, smoking, junk food consumption and truancy.  
 
However, there is much evidence to suggest that surveillance systems do not ensure 
security – indeed there was both an armed guard and video surveillance system at 
Columbine. This begs the question why there has been such an increase in new 
surveillance technologies in recent years.  There are of course, as with any 
phenomenon, many reasons, which are inevitably interconnected. These include “a 
broader societal trend towards a ‘politics of fear’ (Altheide, 2006, 2009) or ‘culture of 
fear’ (Furedi, 2002)” (Marx & Steeves, 2010:214), and a commercial enterprise for 
security device businesses (Casella, 2010).  Alternatively as Ragnedda (2010) argues,  
 
Surveillance is much more than simply monitoring, watching and recording 
individuals and their data.  […] Surveillance is an interaction of power that 
creates and advances relations of domination. In practice, surveillance is a 
mode of governance, one that controls access and opportunities. (p. 356) 
 
There is therefore more to surveillance regimes than monitoring and security. As yet, 
few have explored the links between increased school surveillance and the counter-
terrorism agenda, particularly in the UK.   
 
 
Reading the work of Judith Butler through the lens of Critical Race Theory 
 
In this article I use insights from CRT as well as the work of Judith Butler (2004a, b, 
2010) to consider the possible racial implications of the extensive use of new 
technologies of surveillance in UK secondary schools.  Whilst acknowledging that 
there are tensions in combining CRT – generally considered a structuralist approach – 
and the work of Judith Butler – generally located in the poststructuralist tradition 
although more recently shifting towards a more critical perspective - I argue that using 
insights from both allows us a more in-depth study of the production of race and racial 
identities and the implications of this for policy making in the UK (see Chadderton 
forthcoming 2013 for detail of this argument). I draw parallels between the two 
theories in order to consider the way in which some lives are recognised as fully 
human lives, and others are not.  




CRT provides an explicit structural framework for investigating racism and the way 
racism operates. It considers the basis of constitutional law and all arising institutional 
and social arrangements to be based on the interests of those politically designated 
“white”, which is referred to as a system of white supremacy. White supremacy in this 
context does not refer specifically to extreme forms of oppression such as slavery or 
apartheid, or to the actions of white right-wing extremists (although these are also 
taken seriously), but to a system of everyday oppression and exploitation which 
benefits the interests of whites as a political collective (Allen, 2001).  In this journal 
and others there has recently raged a debate between academics over the usefulness of 
CRT as a tool to investigate racial inequalities in the UK and whether it provides too 
much focus on race as a category whilst obscuring class, the more traditional unit of 
analysis in the UK, and the relation between race and class (see for example Cole, 
2009; Hill, 2009; Gillborn, 2010; Preston, 2010).  It is beyond the remit of this paper 
to provide an outline of this debate, however, in my discussion of CRT I will refer to 
many of the same themes as in this debate. Suffice to say that in my reading of CRT, 
race does not replace class as a determiner of educational experience, rather it 
foregrounds race as a key determiner, and some situations cannot be explained 
without an understanding of race. For example, despite being a member of the 
privileged classes and the president of the US, Barack Obama’s American citizenship 
was called into question by the US right-wing for reasons of race: his African roots 
and his Muslim middle name, Hussein.  
 
The term white supremacy does not necessarily refer to skin colour, rather to 
structures of subordination and domination, something which tends to be 
misunderstood by CRT’s critics (for example Cole, 2009).  Despite the official 
acknowledgement of structural and possibly unwitting racism in the term 
“institutional racism”, which identified covert racism in the police force in 1999, 
racism in the UK still tends to be understood in terms of extreme, violent acts, or the 
openly racist rhetoric of the British National Party or Neo-Nazi groups (Moschel, 
2007). This structural framework is thus very useful as an analytical tool for 
understanding covert racism.  Importantly, critical race theorists argue that white 
supremacy is a system so deeply engrained in western cultures that it frequently goes 
unnoticed, perceived simply as normal or natural (Ladson-Billings, 1998). The 
question in this analysis is not whether white supremacy can be identified, but how it 
is manifested.   
 
As my own racial positioning is “so-called white” I do not pretend that my use of 
CRT is not to some extent problematic.  However, I engage with CRT as a theory and 
analytical tool whilst explicitly rejecting those tendencies in whiteness studies for 
whites to dwell self-indulgently on their own whiteness, hoping that in some way this 
piece, even coming from a white author, has some legitimacy, operating both within 
and against whiteness (Ignatiev, 1997).   
 
Critical Race Theorists have examined the role of the war on terror in shaping racial 
discourses and racial oppression.  Ladson-Billings (2003) explores the way in which 
since the attack on September 11
th
, 2001 (“9/11”), discourses around US identities 
have become polarised into those who are with the US, and those who are against.  
Oztas (2011) argues that there has been a similar response in the UK, rendered more 
potent through the London bombings on 7
th
 July 2005 (“7/7”). The population is 
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perceived as split into two groups: a group which is to be protected from threat, and a 
group which is threatening (Oztas, 2011).  In this case the “allegedly suspect” 
terrorists are Muslims, pre-defined as belonging to a culture which does not share the 
values of the west.  This builds on longstanding discourses of Islam as an under 
developed culture which condones, even encourages violence. Oztas argues that the 
image of Muslims in the UK is also confused with notions of a visible immigrant, the 
Other who threatens the west with a presumed lack of civilised values. The notion of 
terrorism is perceived as essentially linked to this ‘incompatibility’ with western life, 
which in effect implicates all Muslims. Thus links with violence and threat are seen as 
integral to Islam, and by association, to all Muslims.  As Ladson-Billings (2003) 
argues, the division of populations in this way has implications for who can be 
considered a citizen of a given nation, and who, by implication, cannot.  
 
In this article, I read the work of Judith Butler through a CRT lens. Her work is useful 
for scholars exploring the way in which subjectivities are constituted, allowing a 
critical, in-depth study of the way in which identities are produced and re-produced 
through political frames which tend to favour white-western, male and middle class 
identities. While dealing with inequalities, her work tends to be associated with 
gender discrimination rather than race.  However, her more recent work does have a 
racial focus, dealing with the way in which “recognisability” as a human is racially 
framed, and the implications this has for counter-terrorism measures (Butler, 2004a, 
2010).   
 
For Butler, identity categories do not reflect essential or innate subjectivities. Rather, 
identities are discursively constituted, by which is meant is that all identities are 
actually produced, by discourse.  Butler’s recent work considers the way lives are 
divided into those which are fully “recognisable” as human, and those which are not.  
By recognisable, she means conceivable as lives on an equal level as other lives: 
 
The terms by which we are recognised as human are socially articulated and 
changeable.  And sometimes the very terms that confer “humanness” on some 
individuals are those that deprive certain other individuals of the possibility 
of achieving that status, producing a differential between the human and the 
less-than-human.  These norms have far-reaching consequences for how we 
understand the model of the human entitled to rights or included in the 
participatory sphere of political deliberation.  The human is understood 
differently depending on its race, the legibility of that race, its morphology, 
the legibility of that morphology, its sex, the perceptual verifiability of that 
sex, its ethnicity, the categorical understanding of that ethnicity.  Certain 




Thus lives and bodies are understood, “recognised”, according to social norms, and 
will have different entitlements to rights.  Those with fewer rights, she argues, will be 
recognised as “less-than-human”. 
 
 
...specific lives cannot be apprehended as injured or lost if they are not first 
apprehended as living.  If certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the 
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start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then 
these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense.  
 
(Butler, 2010: 1) 
 
These lives which do not fully count as lives, are, on the contrary, regarded as a threat 
to life.  This therefore justifies a defence, in cases where recognisable lives are 
perceived to be under threat. Lives, then, in a Butlerian framework, are produced 
through specific mechanisms of power, 
 
These categories, conventions and norms that prepare or establish a subject 
for recognition [...] precede and make possible the act of recognition itself.  
In this sense, recognisability precedes recognition.  
 
(Butler, 2010: 5) 
 
As the discourses which constitute the subject pre-exist the subject, an individual 
subject is perceived as the embodiment of the discourse. This is very relevant for the 
differentiation of bodies through the counter-terrorism agenda.  Racial frames 
“differentiate […] in advance who will count as a life, and who will not” (Butler, 
2010: xxix). A “frame” in Butlerian terms, is a collection of discourses which shapes 
perception. Contrary to early critiques of Butler’s work, she argues that these frames, 
whilst discursive, are not “merely” perceptual or cultural: they have material effects 
on real lives and interaction (see for example, Butler, 1998). I use the notion of 
material here, not in the historical Marxist sense, but in a critical realist sense, to refer 
to the ‘real’. Butler then, particularly her more recent work which has shifted away 
from what could be termed a more extreme poststructuralist stance, can be read 
materially through the use of “frames” of reference and CRT can be read through a 
Butlerian-materialist frame.   
 
In this way, Butler’s work has parallels with CRT.  Perceived racial heritage defines 
whether an individual belongs to the group which threatens the west, or that which is 
under threat. As Ladson-Billings (2003) argues, those who are perceived as a threat 
are viewed simplistically as evil and irrational and even non-human. Oztas (2011) 
argues that those of (perceived) Arab, North African or Middle Eastern heritage find 
themselves outside the law, as it is individuals from these groups whose citizenship 
rights are most likely to be suspended both under English (Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005; Civil Contingencies Act 2004) and US law (USA Patriot Act 2001).  These 
racial groups, then, have become the (imagined, nevertheless, with real consequences) 
embodiment of threat.  In being beyond the law, their position as (perceived) non-
human is reified- without the rights of a citizen, it could be argued they are rendered a 
non-human subject.  Thus in counter-terrorism discourses, (perceived) racial groups 
who are likely to be Muslims are recognised (in Butlerian terms) as non-human.  
 
Some might argue that the notion of less-than-human is extreme, however, Bell’s 
(1993) critical race counter-narrative, “Space Traders” illustrates how “aliveness” is a 
conditional allowance of a system of oppression and not a universal category or 
“right”.  In “Space Traders” the ontological existence of African Americans is 
withdrawn by whites when a better “offer” is made by aliens.  Thus we see how even 
“aliveness” is an “interest convergence” that is mobilised only when it is in the 
interests of whites, and can be withdrawn at any time.   
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There are further similarities between Butler’s work and CRT. Some critiques of CRT 
consider that, despite its emphasis on racial formation, it is essentialist and “…the 
essentialism inherent in the original epistemological intent of ‘race’ is preserved” 
(Darder & Torres, 2004).  Hill (2009), in this journal, argued that the concept of white 
supremacy is “too blunt” (p3).  However, the potential instability of the fixidity of 
race to bodies presumed by Butler is, it could be argued, inherent in understanding the 
ways in which CRT comprehends the significance of white supremacy in making 
oppressive racial identifications. The fixidity of race requires the everyday and 
ongoing exercise of white supremacy. Theorising white supremacy is therefore 
necessary to understanding how race is not only recognised as embodied but also how 
this constitutes, and is constituted by, a form of power.  Ignatiev (1995), for example, 
demonstrates how the Irish in the US have not always been considered white, rather 
they actually chose to become white.  White supremacy, understood through a 
Butlerian lens, is therefore a shifting and fluid notion and historically located. 
 
 
The return to sovereignty and the “state of exception” 
 
Butler (2004a) has argued that the “war on terror” and its implications for citizens in 
western democracies is illustrative of a return from what Foucault termed 
governmentality – a system of governmental control in which power is de-centred and 
exerted by shaping the behaviour, attitudes and subjectivities of citizens in order to 
effect self-regulation – towards sovereignty and the more overt exercise of state 
power.   Importantly, she argues that sovereignty was never completely replaced by 
governmentality, rather, it could be reintroduced by those in positions of power 
whenever they felt it necessary. She links this shift to sovereignty to the notion of the 
“state of exception”, based on the work of Agamben (1998, 2005) who argues that 
western democracies have reintroduced a permanent state of exception, in which the 
so-called democratic state can suspend laws and engage in actions for which public 
consent is not sought.  Agamben uses the situation of the Jewish people under the 
Nazis to exemplify the state of exception, suggesting that the Nazi terror was not 
necessarily exceptional, rather, an extreme form of sovereignty which can be 
reintroduced in a democracy by the powerful at any time. Whenever they choose, he 
argues, the powerful can reduce groups of citizens to what he refers as bare life, or 
mere physical existence, thus exercising sovereignty and removing from these groups 
the protection of law.  He equates these dispossessed groups to the homo sacer, a 
paradoxical figure from Roman Law, who may not be used for sacrifice, but may be 
killed by anyone without this being considered a crime. This paradox illustrates the 
dual nature of the homo sacer: this is a figure, who does not enjoy the rights of a 
citizen, and therefore may not live a political life, yet s/he leads a life defined by 
politics. Colatrella (2011) in this journal, has critiqued the work of Agamben, arguing 
that he exaggerates our present situation, which cannot be compared to that of the 
Holocaust. However, it is perhaps worth recognising that there are common features: 
Butler (2004a) takes up the notion of the state of exception to consider the 
implications of the war on terror for western democracies, in particular the US. She 
argues that an indefinite, all-pervasive “state of emergency” has been introduced in 
which laws can be suspended at the will of those in power, giving as an example the 
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indefinite detention of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, suggesting that such 
measures are “the means by which the exceptional becomes established as a 
naturalised norm” (p.67).  As Douglas (2009: 37) argues “in the state of exception, 
what needs to be emphasised is that it is not a power relation of pure violence, but 
rather, of potential violence.” 
 
Butler argues that there is a racial and ethnic frame through which certain groups are 
viewed such that they are deemed less than human, a condition she equates with the 
homo sacer- a group who are deprived of their rights as citizens, it is this condition 
which can be seen as a power relation of potential violence. In the case of the war on 
terror, the frame through which the less than human are viewed is Islam.  Like the 
critical race theorists cited above, Butler argues that Islam is regarded as beyond the 
hegemonic norms of the West, which positions Muslims as suspicious or threatening.  
It is the fact that all Muslims, or those taken to be Muslim, Arabs, or Middle Eastern 
are viewed through a racial frame defining them as threatening and non-western, 
which means that these citizens are considered to embody the threat of terror, which 
they are seen to carry as an essential part of their subjectivity, and which therefore 
allows them to be “recognised” as non-citizens. As non-citizens, they do not enjoy the 
same entitlement to rights as citizens, and deprived of legal protection, Muslims 
become recognised as “humans who are not humans”, or the potential homo sacer.  
As such, sovereignty differentiates between humans on grounds of (perceived) race 
and ethnicity. Thus Butler (2004a) argues that managing a population does not only 
produce subjects, “it is also the process of their de-subjectivation, one with enormous 
political and legal consequences” (p.98). This process is justified to the population, 
where justification is required, on grounds of the necessity of a “state of emergency”, 
requiring sometimes extreme political responses to the alleged terrorist threat. 
 
I now move on to consider how new technologies of surveillance in schools have 
racial implications, using a Butlerian reading of CRT.      
 
Linking school surveillance, counter-terrorism and race 
 
Some might argue that the link between surveillance in schools and the counter-
terrorism agenda is quite tenuous.  However, research has shown that the counter-
terrorism agenda is changing the face of our cities in particular, creating new borders, 
restrictions and regulations (see for example Coaffee & Rogers, 2008).  The link 
between school surveillance and counter-terrorism in the UK has been made explicit 
through government policy and documentation allocating education staff a role in 
monitoring extremism: The Prevent strategy (re-launched and re-focused 2011) and 
The Channel Project both aim to prevent young people from becoming radicalised 
(Home Office, 2011).  Although counter-terrorism agendas in the last decade have 
focused on various groups and ideologies, including the far right, animal rights 
groups, student protestors, anarchists, Irish nationalists and Islamic extremism, the 
present UK government has focused primarily on the Islamic threat, stating on the 
Prevent website, “[c]urrently, the greatest threat comes from Al Qa’ida, its affiliates 
and like-minded groups”. The Department for Education and Schools (2005) 
produced guidance for schools after 7/7 focused on their capacity to tackle terrorism 
directly and called for teachers to be involved “more explicitly in national security 
issues than at any time in British history” (Preston, 2009: 196). The Department for 
UK secondary schools under surveillance 
83 | P a g e  
 
Children Schools and Families (2008) introduced an “extremism toolkit” for schools, 
“Learning together to be safe: a toolkit to help schools contribute to the prevention of 
violent extremism”, also tying schools into surveillance and counter-terrorism 
agendas. Citizenship Education, introduced as a discrete subject on the National 
Curriculum for England and Wales in 2002, “has a surveillance function through 
identifying those who might hold extremist or negative values” (Preston, 2009: 196; 
see also Chadderton, 2009). Higher Education providers are expected to engage with 
Special Branch (a unit of the British police responsible for national security and 
criminal intelligence) to monitor students for signs of radicalism. In the US, in the 
wake of 9/11 and the Beslan school hostage crisis in which Chechan Islamic militants 
took 1100 people hostage at a North Ossetia school, the Department of Homeland 
Security made grants available for the purchase of security systems in schools 
(Casella, 2006, in Monahan & Torres, 2010: 4).   
 
Of course schools have long engaged in surveillance practices such as physical 
observation, attendance registers, dress codes and behaviour policies, exams, tests and 
publishing of League Tables (cf. Foucault, 1991). However, more recently, school 
children are subject to much more rigid regimes – indeed, some would argue they are 
criminalised by such practices (Giroux, 2009).  Any deviations from the norm are 
punished very severely: levels of exclusion from secondary schools have risen to 
unprecedented levels in the UK, and schools more frequently resort to punishments 
involving the police for misdemeanours which would previously have been dealt with 
by staff, parents and governors. We have also seen the introduction of on-site police 
officers (more common in the US, but still present at least part-time in some, 
particularly inner-city UK schools), the presence of whom, it could be argued, links 
the school and criminal justice system.  Although it would be unrealistic to argue that 
the only reason for these shifts towards more rigid regimes of control is the war on 
terror, as we can see from the policies mentioned above, and following Judith Butler, 
it makes sense to assume that the counter-terror agenda is impacting on and feeding 
into education policy.   
 
It is often presumed that surveillance is neutral and “democratic”, that is, it affects all 
sectors of society equally, as we are all under surveillance (Monahan & Torres, 2010).  
Normally, the work of Foucault and his writing on the panopticon are used when 
theorising surveillance.  Foucault’s work certainly allows us to understand how the 
modern, western world is governed by biopolitical power which functions by 
disciplining subjects so they internalise the discipline and creating “docile bodies” 
(Foucault, 1991). However, Foucault did not differentiate between these docile bodies 
in terms of race.  Viewed through a CRT lens however, surveillance cannot be 
considered racially neutral. The racial aspect of new technologies of school 
surveillance has rarely been made explicit. A small amount of work has been done in 
the US (Monahan & Torres, 2010; Simmons, 2010), and I have been able to find 
nothing in the UK.  A recent project on the ‘surveilled’ (McCahill & Finn, 2010) 
examined the social impact of new surveillance technologies on the lives of school 
children living in a Northern English city, including looking at 13 to 16 year-old 
children in three schools.  It found that children’s experiences differed across social 
class and gender, but did not examine the implications for race.  Recent work on 
surveillance in general has identified “social sorting” (see Lyon, 2003) which 
“indicates the tendency for surveillance systems to operate as mechanisms for societal 
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differentiation” (Monahan & Fisher, 2008: 219). Therefore existing inequalities are 
likely to be reproduced by surveillance regimes (Monahan & Fisher, 2008; Simmons, 
2010).  
 
As we have seen, the counter-terror agenda is shaped by a racial frame. Since the 
discourses which shape the frame tend to be implicit rather than explicit, I draw on 
CRT to render the racial aspects of school surveillance visible.  In the counter-
terrorism context, as I argue above, racial minorities, particularly those who are 
perceived to be Muslims, are already positioned as embodying threat and thus in need 
of control and surveillance. Minority ethnic individuals are already disproportionately 
subjected to more surveillance outside school, such as police “stop and search” 
practices on the streets, airport controls and police profiling “which continue to rely 
upon racial markers of ‘risk’.” (Monahan & Fisher, 2008: 217).  Black, Asian or 
Minority Ethnic groups (BAME) are seven times more likely to be stopped and 
searched than white people. The number of arrests for the white group decreased 
during 2010-11, however arrests of Black persons rose by 5% and arrests of Asian 
people by 13%. 26% of the prison population comes from BAME groups. In 2010, the 
highest average custodial sentence length (ACSL) for those given determinate 
sentences for indictable offences was recorded for the Black ethnic group, at 20.8 
months, followed by the Asian and Other groups with averages of 19.9 months and 
19.7 months respectively. The lowest ACSL was recorded for the white group at 14.9 
months (all data Justice, 2011). Equally, in a school context, research has shown that 
minority ethnic young people are more likely to be excluded from school than white 
young people (Gillborn, 2006).  It has been suggested that one reason for this is the 
perception of teachers, many of whom view minority ethnic children as a challenge or 
threat, their perceptions shaped by dominant discourses (for example, Mac an Ghaill, 
1988; Gillborn, 1990; Mirza, 1992; Basit, 1997). 
 
As yet there is a lack of empirical research linking new technologies of surveillance in 
schools and race, and we can only assume the impact on young people’s subjectivities 
and racial inequalities. Other research has argued that those who are perceived to be in 
need of surveillance are positioned as suspects (Monahan & Torres, 2010).  McCahill 
and Finn (2010) suggested that the females in their study were more acutely aware of 
being under surveillance because women’s bodies already tend to be more scrutinised 
than men’s.  As racial minorities are already frequently positioned as threatening or 
suspects, and are already more scrutinised than whites, it makes sense to assume that 
school surveillance is likely to impact more harshly on racial minorities than their 
white counterparts, and these discourses are likely to build on longstanding notions of 
perceived essentialised links between minority ethnic bodies and criminality and 
threat (Oztas, 2011).  Research on surveillance technologies in general has pointed to 
the importance of the interpretation of the body in the way in which surveillance 
devices are employed.  In his study of young working class males, Nayak (2006: 64) 
showed how they are excluded from clubs and bars in the city centre because of their 
dress and the way they move.  Equally a study by Norris and Armstrong showed that 
“[t]hose responsible for operating open-street CCTV surveillance cameras use them to 
target young working class males who have their ‘head up, back straight, upper body 
moving too much’, or those who were ‘swaggering, looking hard’” (Norris and 
Armstrong 1999: 122, cited in McCahill and Finn, 2010: 286). These examples 
suggest that the way in which different bodies and their behaviours are “recognised” 
(in Butlerian terms) is dependent on dominant discourses of race, class and gender.  It 
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therefore seems likely that new technologies of surveillance will regulate and control 
bodies accordingly, and that the existing raced dynamic in schools will be reinforced 
by increased surveillance. 
 
Reproducing white supremacy and the homo sacer 
 
A CRT analysis of schooling allows us to theorise the links between school 
surveillance, counter-terrorism and race and see schools as sites where the counter-
terrorism agenda will be played out.  Critical race theorists have extended the analysis 
of others (for example Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Durkheim, 1956) to argue that 
not only does formal education have a specific function to teach loyalty to the state 
and to ensure the maintenance of the social status quo, it ensures the maintenance of 
white supremacy (Ladson-Billings, 1998; Gillborn, 2006). Thus we see that white 
supremacy is not a fixed structure, rather it requires continual maintenance work, to 
which this new surveillance regime potentially contributes.  Following Butler, it can 
be argued that through the framing of specific bodies as threat, these bodies become a 
legitimate target.  Taking the example of photography, she writes that photographs 
both allocate positions to those on camera, the target, and those behind the camera, the 
viewer, and remove the wider context in which these photographs are taken, playing a 
key role in producing the subject, 
 
cameras [...] both frame and form the human and non-human target [...] In a 
way, that focussing on the target produces a position for the soldier, the 
reporter, and the public audience, structuring the visual field that makes each 
position possible.  The frame not only orchestrates such positions, but also 
delimits the visual field itself.  
 
(Butler, 2010: x-xi) 
 
Surveillance can be seen as creating a similar process: the fact that bodies already 
“recognised” as threat are under surveillance, actually reproduces their subject 
position as threat.  In the context of the “war on terror”, Muslim lives are not fully 
recognisable as lives, but rather are viewed as threat to life.  They are, indeed, already 
recognised as a terrorist threat, and as “recognisability precedes recognition” (Butler, 
2010:5), increased surveillance and monitoring will ensure that young people who are 
Muslims are the embodiment of the threat.  As Butler explains, this “recognition” of 
threat further justifies the increase in surveillance. 
 
Lives are divided into those representing certain kinds of states and those 
representing threats to state-centred liberal democracy, so that war can then 
be righteously waged on behalf of some lives, while the destruction of other 
lives can be righteously defended.  
 
(Butler, 2010: 53) 
 
Once Muslim citizens are recognised as a threat to life, and their surveillance is 
justified, they become the less-than-human, as they are recognised as the embodiment 
of the threat to Britishness, and therefore they are vulnerable to the potential violence 
of the position of non-citizen, non-human, whose entitlement to rights is very much 
reduced – potentially the homo sacer.  For a group already frequently positioned as 
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unbritish, as explained above, Muslims, or those perceived as Muslims, their 
vulnerability is only compounded. 
 
When a population appears as a direct threat to my life, they do not appear as 
“lives”, but as the threat to life (a living figure that figures the threat to life).  
Consider how this is compounded under those conditions in which Islam is 
seen as barbaric or pre-modern, as not yet having conformed to those norms 
that make the human recognisable.  
 
(Butler, 2010: 42) 
 
Moreover, those bodies which are caught in the background of the CCTV images, 
those which are not understood to be directly under surveillance, are reconfirmed in 
their “innocence”- indeed, recognised as full lives – in this case, those whose lives are 
perceived as under threat, the white British. Thus surveillance is actively producing 
those divided populations identified by critical race theorists. The CCTV camera, 
then, creates and re-creates the frame, “[t]he frame does not simply exhibit reality, but 
actively participates in a strategy of containment, selectively producing and enforcing 
what will count as reality” (Butler, 2010: xiii).  Also we can observe at a micro-level 
the process of desubjectivation identified by Butler, in which a group of citizens, 
Muslims, already defined as threat, come to be recognised as the non-citizen, 
described as the less-than-human or the homo sacer, as the group whose perceived 
need for surveillance justifies their continued and increased surveillance, which in 
turn reproduces their subject position as beyond human, or indeed, de-subjectivates.   
 
Drawing on both Judith Butler and CRT, then, I argue that the surveillance and 
monitoring procedures for allegedly ensuring the security of young people at school in 
the UK are actually reproducing structures of white supremacy and both the discourse 
and the materiality of race.  The installation of new surveillance technologies can be 
seen, at least partly, as a response to counter-terrorism discourses, and in addition, 
feed into and re-produce these discourses.  Surveillance procedures actually produce 
the recognisability of white bodies as lives, and minority ethnic bodies as threat, 
therefore maintaining the structures of white supremacy.  As subjectivities are seen as 
discursively constituted, this is likely to have a very real effect on the way in which 
young people are perceived and perceive themselves. 
 
Moreover, whilst the process may not yet be complete, it could be argued that the 
state of exception is creeping into the liberal democracy of the UK.  The state of 
exception, then, is characterized by the suspension of “normal” law to protect the 
interest of the sovereign, and the removal from the political realm of a specific group, 
which is treated as bare life, in that must be “constantly monitored and exposed to the 
potentiality of violence” (Douglas, 2009:33).  It cannot be overlooked that the 
demands on educational institutions to monitor young people are made in the wider 
context of provisions for the temporary suspension of citizenship rights.  These laws, 
as Douglas argues, “essentially nullify the application of normal laws protecting 
human rights, while still holding them technically ‘in force’” (Douglas, 2009:33).  It 
is these “exceptional” laws which justify the increased surveillance, and it is in this 
way that the state of exception is becoming “normal”.  Douglas (2009) argues that 
  
[m]aking people suspects is equivalent to making people bare life [...] 
Electronic and biometric surveillance are the tactics through which the 
UK secondary schools under surveillance 
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government is creating a space in which the exception is routine practice. The 
biopolitical implication of surveillance is the universalization of bare life: 
“History teaches us how practices first reserved for foreigners find 
themselves applied later to the rest of the citizenry” 
  
(Agamben, 2004).  
 
These new control measures have created a situation in which not only is 
there no clear distinction between private and political life, but there is no 
fundamental claim, or right, to a political life as such – not even for citizens 
from birth; thus, the originary biopolitical act that inscribes life as political 
from birth is more and more a potential depoliticization and ban from the 
political realm. (p. 37)  
 
Those young people “recognised” as threatening in the counter-terrorism context fulfil 
the criteria of the homo sacer- they are constantly monitored, their rights to privacy 
suspended (Taylor, 2010), potentially vulnerable to the complete withdrawal of their 
citizenship rights, they are depoliticised whilst being hyperpolitically defined.  
Therefore although to some the notion of an encroaching state of exception in 
democratic Europe may be extreme, if we take the example of new regimes and 
technologies of surveillance in many UK schools, it could be argued that many 
features of a permanent state of emergency, thus the state of exception, are 
increasingly defining our lives as extreme measures are resorted to in response to a 




In this paper I have argued that new regimes of surveillance in UK secondary schools 
are partially linked to the government’s counter-terrorism agenda, and have 
implications for the ways in which populations are divided along lines of race.  Using 
a framework which draws on both the work of critical race theorists and Judith Butler, 
I have shown how the war on terror is both fed by, and reinforces and reproduces an 
existing regime of white supremacy.  I have also suggested that the war on terror has 
ushered in an era of increased sovereignty, the key to understanding how this regime 
of surveillance is justified: 
 
Sovereignty becomes that instrument of power by which law is either used 
tacitly or suspended, populations are monitored, detained, regulated, 
inspected, interrogated, rendered uniform in their actions, fully ritualised and 
exposed to control and regulation in their daily lives.  
 
(Butler 2004a: 97). 
 
I have suggested that racial frames differentiate who will be “recognisable” (in 
Butlerian terms) as human and less-than-human, and have equated this to Agamben’s 
(1998) notion of homo sacer and bare life, which, although it may seem extreme to 
some, seems to describe well the encroaching state of exception in the liberally 
democratic UK. Thus we see a shift from the decentred power of governmentality 
towards the more overt power of sovereignty in which existing laws can be suspended 
whist still being in effect, and certain groups are marginalised to the extent of being 
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beyond the protection of law – in the case of the war on terror, it is Muslims or those 
who appear to be of Arab or Middle Eastern heritage who are “recognised” as less-
than-human.  
 
I conclude by calling for more empirical research on the extent, meaning, and 
implications of the explosion of new technologies of surveillance in UK schools, 
including further work which explores the perceptions and resistances of those 
implicated in this surveillance, as we cannot presume that young people are passive 
receivers of these regimes of surveillance (Hope, 2005).  Equally, my study illustrates 
that more research is needed on the implications of the counter-terrorism agenda for 
educational spaces, and the social consequences for young people and education of 
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